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REVIEW ESSAY
Anya Bernstein
SUNY Buffalo Law School
The Clinic and the Court: Law, Medicine, and Anthropology. 
Edited by Ian Harper, Tobias Kelly, and Akshay Khanna (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015)
The Role of Social Science in Law
Edited by Elizabeth Mertz (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008)
As the internal workings of the state—and not just the state’s effects on 
others—become ever more central to anthropological inquiry (Bernstein and
Mertz 2008), the social production of legal strictures also becomes an 
increasingly important area of study. Legal pronouncement, after all, is one of 
the primary languages spoken by the state. And, like many pronouncements, 
legal strictures attempt both to represent the world and to intervene in it
(Hacking 1983; Constable 2014). Any legal pronouncement, after all, rests on 
some understanding—perhaps implicit—of the object it refers to.1 
How do these understandings come about, though, and how do they affect the
way that laws are formulated and carried out? Scholars have taught us a great
deal about how law wends its way through the world: how law on the books is
changed upon the blue guitar of its many contexts. Two recent books present
an opportunity to think in the other direction, asking how context—the world 
law addresses—makes its way into legal understandings, strictures, and 
interpretations. One edited volume focuses on medicine; the other on social
science. Each shows how expert discourses interact with the expert discourse
of law, being shaped by it and shaping it from the inside. And each provides a
chance to consider how we can study the role of context in law: how to 
recognize moments where legal actors pick out aspects of the world as
relevant, how to evaluate their interpretations of those aspects, and how to 
trace those interpretations as they make their way into the law. 
The Clinic and the Court examines how medical expertise interacts with legal
process. Its chapters discuss public health regulations as sites of cultural
control and cultural expression; the uneasy implication of medical
practitioners in establishing legally cognizable offenders and victims; the
integration of psychological categories and treatments as terms in legal
systems; and the mobilization of legal process in the provision of medicines
DOI: 10.1111/plar.12145
                                                                                     
 
  
     
    
         
    
         




       
      
     
          
    
      
  
     
     
        
      
    
     
        
     
       
    
    
      
        
          
 
 
         
       
  
        
         
    
       
     
      
       
     
    
    
    
Page 2 PoLAR Online
and medical decisions. Each chapter brings face to face two expert discourses, 
each of which sometimes claims for itself a uniquely powerful, monolithic
status. The challenge, then, is to believe neither at the same time: to show how
both have porous borders, internally complex organization, and characteristics
that are subject to change. That means imagining law and medicine not as two 
complete, bounded wholes colliding on the field of the social, but as
continuously interpenetrating influences on partly formed, partly developing 
tendencies. 
Some chapters set up an epistemological contrast in which legality’s demands
for certainty and closure dominate and pervert the empirical, realist impulses
of medical practice. Medical actors are uncomfortably interpellated by legal
process in Tobias Kelly’s The Causes of Torture and Estelle d’Halluin’s Local
Justice in the Allocation of Medical Certificates, in which British and French 
doctors, respectively, are asked to pass judgment on the medical claims of 
asylum seekers. For Kelly, immigration agencies’ need for legal certainty— 
has this person in fact been tortured?—overwhelms medicine’s recognition of 
the inherently inconclusive character of many physical symptoms. Doctors are
loath to assign a single ultimate cause to symptoms that could result from
several events, but that medically proper reluctance ends up supporting a
structural suspicion of asylum claimants’ honesty. D’Halluin’s doctors
distribute their scarce resources among too many applicants. That resource
pressure makes medical centers, the “gatekeepers” to the asylum process (p. 
119), inconsistent in how they approach their obligations to asylum seekers
and the legal system they supplicate—obligations that are themselves often 
incongruent. Patients, as medical actors, are no better off. In Naomi Richards’ 
Dying to Go to Court, a terminally ill British woman decides against seeking 
medical assistance in ending her life out of fear that her husband would be
prosecuted for accompanying her. Chapters like these show how the blunt
demands of the legal system can distort the more subtle realities of medical
practice. 
But the most illuminating essays for me were those that managed to also show
the subtleties of the legal field, and to demonstrate how it, too, is changed 
through interaction with other discourses. In João Biehl’s Juridical Hospital, 
Brazilian lawyers use their Constitution’s guarantee of “health” that force the
government to provide medicine to the poor—cases that make legal judgment
turn on medical need. Judges are asked to collaborate with prescribing 
physicians against the stingy state, whose administrators resist spending public
money on expensive drugs. The case-by-case work and individual rationalities
of judges obstruct administrators’’ attempts at generalized, rational budget
planning (pp. 182–185).2 They also portray the right to health as a right to 
medicine—a pharmaceutical framing that displaces other available definitions, 
such as preventive care or health-sustaining economic distribution (p. 174). 
Thus, legal conceptions emerge from an internally differentiated field of 






       
 
 
     
        
      
     
       
         
     
    
      
    
        
 
 
       
  
    
      
         
     
      
      
 
 
      
        
    
       
     
    
     
    
         
    
    
  
   
        
    
         
  
 
       
    
2016 Page 3 
from the inside by the medical discourse, with its own peculiar economic
structuring, which influence how the law understands the context of health. 
In a similarly interactive vein, Gethin Reese’s Contentious Roommates?
explores the practices of forensic nurses working with sexual assault victims
in Canada, England, and Wales. Treating injuries, discussing health effects, 
and collecting evidence for possible prosecution, these nurses work at the
medical-legal boundary. Sometimes they enforce that boundary: they 
legalistically ensure that a rape kit produces juridically cognizable evidence, 
but keep police out of the room for what they deem to be the clinical, rather 
than the legal, part of post-assault treatment. Other times, they negate the
medical-legal boundary by letting the victim, rather than the expert discourse, 
determine their practice. The client-centered attitude focuses on the victim’s
comfort, needs, and decision-making capacities across discursive fields. It
illustrates how both medical and legal practices are developing as practitioners
recognize their deep interconnection.3 
At their best, then, this book’s chapters think of law and medicine as two 
internally variegated discourses, each in motion, entering one another in ways
that change both. In this, they sometimes exceed the editors’ introductory 
framing, which posits that “legal decision-making is a process of trying to 
move beyond questions of fact as fast as possible, in order to arrive at legal
debates” (p. 8), and that law attempts to work with “near total self-
referentiality” p. 9). As individual chapters demonstrate, though, this image
paints things a bit too cleanly, ignoring internal differentiations in principles, 
personnel, trope, and scope. 
Context, after all, enters different legal institutions in different ways. Courts
may be nominally limited to the law and the case record, but in fact judicial
opinions often rest on judges’ understandings of the world and their research 
into it. More importantly, courts are not the only, or even the most important, 
law-producing institutions. Legislatures have something to do with law as well
(Gershon 2011). And administrative agencies produce many more
pronouncements with legal effect than do courts or legislatures. In this book 
alone, they regulate refugees and criminals, public health and reparations:
administrative management permeates just about all the legal processes
discussed here. And agencies’ relation to contexts like medical knowledge can 
vary even more than the courts’ relation. Far from striving for self-
referentiality, agencies often work through experts to collect, direct, and 
perform research. They are surely bound by their own logics, such as cost-
benefit analysis or proportionality; but those logics do not necessarily partake
of the self-referential phrasing of doctrine. Such internal tensions and 
transformations are difficult to recognize if one speaks of “law” as a fixed, 
unitary attitude, as the editors sometimes do.4 
The Role of Social Science in Law draws together twenty-four previously 
published articles that range widely across discipline, method, topic, 
                                                                                     
 
  
      
        
      
    
        
      
       
        
       
     
         
 
 
        
       
     
        
       
       
     
         
       
    
       
 
 
      
   
      
      
       
      
 
 
      
         
    
        
         
      
     
         
     
       
        
 
 
Page 4 PoLAR Online
publication, and date. Each of the book’s four parts pairs a section that
explores a general concept with another section that considers that concept in 
a specific area of (mostly American) legal life: the death penalty, 
discrimination, domestic violence, and social struggle. Many chapters here
examine the structural and discursive constraints that shape legal actors’ 
uptake and evaluation of social science research, and how those constraints
shape the uses, and the integrity, of that research in the law. These essays
show how legal practitioners often lack the tools to evaluate the quality of 
social science research, and how the narrative and argumentative forms of 
legal discourse tend to push understandings of social science into narrow, 
decisive framings that pervert the methodologies of the social sciences and 
undermine their findings. 
Others show how knowledges and narrative forms compete on the field of 
legal stricture and obligation, pointing out how legal process itself can validate
particular forms of understanding and give them new powers through their 
role in the law. This validation can be salutary, as when courts recognize new
knowledge about the disempowered, but it can also perpetuate unfairness, as
when agencies devolve responsibilities onto private parties but enforce their 
own idiosyncratic expertise. Other essays examine the power of legal
discourse to shape social categories and cultural identities, as well as the
sometimes oppositional responses that power can elicit. Still others here turn 
their attention to the production of expert discourses themselves, asking legal
academics to study the social structure of the legal profession and social
scientists to see the law as a cultural formation with multiple meanings. 
As this description of themes suggests, there is something in this wide-ranging 
book for everyone interested in the interaction of these disciplines. Elizabeth 
Mertz’s comprehensive, thoughtful introduction ties these diverse works
together through the theme of translation. The thrust of the book, she explains, 
is to examine whether, and how, law and social science can incorporate one
another’s findings, methods, and attitudes without fundamental distortions that
undermine their value and validity.
Appropriately enough, Mertz herself seems unsure of the answer: the
introduction is part hope, part despair. And the chapters point at least as much 
to disciplinary divides and distortions as to interactions and collaborations. 
Edward Rubin’s Law and the Methodology of Law posits that law’s relation to 
social science is paradoxical at its heart. Legal scholarship’s “unique,”
prescriptive “stance…toward its subject matter…precludes the direct
application of another field’s methodology” (p. 177), yet scholars cannot talk 
about law without talking about its relations to the world around it: “the
prescriptions of legal scholarship could not be articulated without a…vision of 
the entities to which the prescriptions are addressed” (p. 198). Thus, legal
discourse relies on understandings of context to formulate even precepts that it
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John Donohue and Justin Wolfers’ Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in 
the Death Penalty Debate, meanwhile, illuminates the deep discomfort that
this generally prescriptive orientation creates for uncertainty. This article re-
examines evidence used to support the argument that the death penalty deters
homicide and concludes that that the data neither sustain nor disprove that
contention—a non-answer legal scholars are resistant to acknowledge. Mertz’s
own study of the law school classroom, Teaching Lawyers the Language of
Law, suggests that some of these disciplinary divides originate in the crucible
of legal training itself, where students are taught, by example, to leave
contextual factors and moral values out of their discussions, and focus instead 
only on legal relevance.5
Bryant Garth is a bit more optimistic—or, at least, his Observations on an 
Uncomfortable Relationship sees the interaction of law and social science as
necessary to law: a realistic vision of the world, he argues, is crucial to 
“legitimating the law” (p. 319). For this legitimation to happen, he suggests, 
lawyers need sometimes to go beyond the tactical prescriptions common in 
legal scholarship and practice and seek out broader understandings of the
world the law works in. Wendy Espeland’s Legally Mediated Identity and 
Jacqueline Urla’s Cultural Politics in an Age of Statistics show how
confrontations of government administrators and disempowered groups that
come under their purview can profoundly influence both groups’ 
understanding of culture, harm, commensurability, and selfhood. In both 
articles, bureaucratic categories and practices imposed unwelcome systems of 
quantification and assessment on marginalized communities. But they also 
provided those groups with new, unexpected tools for self-understanding, self-
expression, and advocacy against the very bureaucratic systems that oppose
them. Lawrence Rosen, in The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, is even more
hopeful, suggesting that many of the problems of using social scientific
evidence in trials could be avoided through procedural changes encouraging 
neutral and balanced presentations, and through greater involvement by 
professional associations in setting standards for members’ participation in 
legal processes. 
Most of the articles here address how legal discourse can, should, and doesn’t
take social science into account. David Nelken’s Can Law Learn from Social
Science? provides a valuable counterbalance, seeking to explain “why law
may have only a limited concern for (social scientific) truth” (p. 159) in the
first place. For Nelken, social science sometimes views law in an overly 
simplistic way as a forum for the making of truth claims and the regulation of 
conduct, ignoring the many other roles law plays: ritual, literature, the
expression of cultural values, an arena for conflicting narratives and 
normativities. If social science is to have any hope of being incorporated 
properly into law, he suggests, social scientists reciprocally need to take
seriously the uneven, internally differentiated distribution of approaches
toward truth and value among law’s institutions. Similarly, Susan Silbey and 
Austin Sarat’s Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research asks scholars
                                                                                     
 
  
   
    
    
 
 
         
     
          
      
        
        
      
 
 
         
       
      
      
     
           
     
    
     
          
 
 
       
         
  
      
        
 
 
         
    
       
        
  
      
    
      
      
     
       
      
 
 
Page 6 PoLAR Online
to study themselves, proposing “a sociology of the sociology of law” (p. 496). 
Both discourses, in other words, are limited in purview and effect; both are
subject to change, including through mutual interaction; and both could use a 
dose more humility and self-awareness. 
These contributions suggest that a narrow focus on legal discourse’s ability to 
correctly understand and incorporate social science may be misplaced, or at
least too partial. Perhaps we should assume that law will digest social science
research in its own way—that context, too, will be changed upon the blue
guitar of law. The essays in this book show that examining just how legal
discourse creates and changes understandings of its context can reveal new
aspects of both law and social science. It could also yield important insights
for how to bring them into closer conversation—if not into commensuration. 
The essays in these important volumes usefully illuminate fissures in the walls
that law builds to set itself off, showing how non-legal knowledges and 
methodologies operate in the very core of legal discourse, influencing legal
decisions and processes from the inside. And they provide tools and 
approaches to use in illuminating other such areas. At the same time, I worry 
that at least parts of these books take a bit for granted the internal structure, 
and specifically the unity, of law itself. After all, the nature of legal action 
depends crucially on distributions of authority, divisions of labor, tropes of 
legitimation, and traditions of practice among the diverse persons and 
institutions that make up the state: the expert discourse of law itself is highly 
internally variegated. 
This may seem obvious. It should seem obvious. And yet the go-to image of 
the legal setting that permeates so much writing about the law is the
courtroom, with its judges, litigators, and opinions. What effect, I wonder, 
does the unmarked nature of that image—which captures such a tiny portion 
of actual legal practice—have on how we formulate scholarship about the law, 
and how we imagine that scholarship interacting with legal discourse?
Different legal institutions act on different instigations; that structures the
scope and style of their legal pronouncements. They collect information 
through different processes; that delimits the sources and substance of their 
evidence and influences how they use it. They are subject to discipline
through different structures of oversight, in differently constructed hierarchies. 
And they are prone to different kinds of challenge, each with its own forms of 
argumentation, legitimation, and effects. These differences are not cosmetic. 
They structure what legal actors and institutions do and how they do it, which 
means they profoundly affect how other expert discourses work within the
legal frame. Attending to this internal variegation—following contexts as they 
wend their way through the numerous institutions that produce law—is thus
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Notes
1. Sometimes the object implicitly figured in a legal pronouncement differ 
from the one its strictures refer to. In my own research (Bernstein 2008), 
for instance, I found that legal strictures governing urban space in Taiwan 
were primarily addressed to an imagined community of international
observers whose legal ideologies were seen to crucially affect Taiwan’s
sovereignty. In contrast, the law did not attempt to represent the actual
spatial world that denizens and developers of the urban space lived in, and 
was enforced irregularly and unenthusiastically.  
2. Of course, the way that legal process can recognize socioeconomic rights
itself depends on local conceptions of law. Brazilian courts, Biehl implies, 
have read Brazil’s Constitution to impose positive obligations on the
state—something American courts have resisted for their Constitution 
(Weinrib 2015).
3. Contrast this with the legal focus of the American forensic nurses discussed 
in Sameena Mullah’s The Violence of Care (2014). In the United States,
“medical-legal partnerships” approach the interconnection from the other 
side: these involve lawyers who place themselves in medical settings to try 
to harness legal process to address socioeconomic aspects of health 
maintenance, such as housing and employment.
4. On the other side, while the editors seem to view medical discourse as
inherently evidence-based, humble before the complexities of its object, in 
fact medicine can also create brittle categories that seem impervious to 
empirical realities. As anyone with a chronic pain condition knows, for 
instance, many medical professionals have difficulty acknowledging things
they cannot fix.
5. These insights are further elaborated in Mertz’s (2007) book-length study.
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